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11.10.2009
SINGLE PARTY VERSUS STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE AHIDJO - BIYA DELAYED TRAUMA OF SUCCESSION
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Christophe Dongmo
ABSTRACT
Retour sur le conflit de suprématie entre le leader du parti unique UNC (Ahidjo) et le président de la république (Paul Biya) sur l’initiative et la mise en œuvre de la politique de la nation en 1983. Si les lois fondamentales étaient sans équivoque sur la suprématie de l’état sur le parti, il n’en demeure pas moins que le parti unique, tant en théorie qu’en pratique, agissait comme l’organe suprême de la nation, définissant la politique et les grandes orientations de celle-ci lors de ses congrès quinquennaux. C’est à ce titre qu’Ahidjo continuera de réclamer son hégémonie même au lendemain de sa démission de la magistrature suprême. Ce conflit d’autorité sera à l’origine de la scission entre les deux personnages marquants du Cameroun moderne. S’en suivront la dénonciation d’un complot en Août 1983, la démission du poste de président national de L’UNC et l’exil forcé du “Père de la Nation,” la démarcation et la mise à l’écart présumée de certaines élites du Grand Nord, le redécoupage provincial, l’abolition du poste de Premier Ministre, et le coup d’état manqué du 6 Avril 1984 entre autres.
AHIDJO AND BIYA - THE TIES THAT DIVIDE
Following Ahmadou Ahidjo’s resignation on November 4, 1982 there was an overt leadership struggle between the Cameroon National Union (UNC) party and the executive branch of the state. Paul Biya, therefore, seized the opportunity to address Ahidjo’s earlier claim regarding the primacy of the party over the state:
As concerns the constitution which the hierarchy of juridical instruments is the most important, it is stated therein that it is the President of the Republic who defines policy of the nation…The same constitution provides that political parties and groups may take part in elections. Thus this instrument, which is the fundamental law of the Nation, defines clearly enough the power of the state and the party. (UNC, Le Renouveau: Deux Ans Après, 1985, p. 15).
Leadership struggles between the two rivals became rift and further increased the ideological divide. During an interview conducted by Henri Bandolo and published by the national daily Cameroon Tribune on January 29, 1983, Ahmadou Ahidjo declared that it was the role of the single Party (UNC) to define and that of the government to execute national policies. News anchorman Bandolo (as he then was) informed the UNC National Chairman that public opinion was talking about the power duality at the helm of the divide between the two most major influential figures of Cameroon history (J. M. Mbakum and J. Takougang , Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya, Africa World Press, 2003).
Ahidjo brushed the question aside and, with supercilious insolence, argued that this so-called misunderstanding between him and Biya was the work of those who no longer wanted to see him in the Yaoundé power circles. Having said that, the Father of the Nation went on challengingly: “As a former President of the Republic, I have the right to accommodation and offices in Yaoundé…” (F. K. Wache, “How an Idyllic Transfer of Power Tourned Sour (II): The Biya-Ahidjo Honeymoon Ends in Acrimony and Blood,” Cameroon Life 1 (11) September 1991).
THE NORTH FALLS APART: CONFLICT OVER A CABINET RESHUFFLE
A first opportunity the new head of state had to test his executive responsibilities was in early 1983, when he failed to implement Ahidjo’s recommendations over a cabinet reshuffle. On January 18, 1983 Biya reshuffled his cabinet without Ahidjo’s consent. Sadou Daoudou, Ahidjo’s long time Minister of Armed Forces (June 1960 – July 1980) and incumbent General Secretary of the Presidency, was dropped from the cabinet, among others. Ahidjo considered this as insulting and disgraceful. He believed that, in his capacity of former head of state and incumbent UNC national chairman, he should have been consulted prior to any reshuffle.
On the same day, Ahidjo summoned all members of the cabinet from both the Grand Nord and the Noun Division to his Lac Residence in Yaoundé. He allegedly convinced most of them to sign a collective resignation letter from the government, which had
to be crafted by Youssoufa Daouda, Minister of Civil Service.
Another meeting was attended exclusively by high-ranking northern military and gendarme officers. Initiated by Maikano Abdoulaye, Minister of Armed Forces, it took place at the residence of Ibrahima Wadjiri, Delegate-General of the National Gendarmerie. The main point on the agenda was to inform them of the impending resignation of northern senior executives from Paul Biya’s cabinet. Although no formal declaration transpired from the proceedings of this encounter, there is reason to believe that senior military and gendarme officers originally from Northern Cameroon and the Noun Division opted to stand by the established institutions (Le Messager, April 6, 1995, p.3).
Two major events prevented Ahidjo and associates from carrying out their collective resignation plan: (1) the intervention of the charismatic Sultan Njoya, traditional King of the Bamoun, who acted promptly upon the recommendation of his son, Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, Paul Biya’s Minister of Youth and Sports; and (2) French President Francois Mitterand who was on state visit to Cameroon from 20 – 21 June, 1983 (P. Gaillard, Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1922 – 1989 (Groupe Jeune Afrique 1994), 226.
Needless to say, the idea behind the collective resignation strategy was to weaken Paul Biya’s power and attract the sympathy of their fellow Northerners in order to compel him to resign. For memory, a similar plan was used against André Marie Mbida, Cameroon’s first pre-independence Prime Minister and leader of the Parti des Démocrates Camerounais. Upon his appointment in May 1957, Mbida was put in minority and pressured to resign in February 1958, following misunderstandings and ideological disagreements with Jean Ramadier, France’s High Commissioner. He was immediately replaced by Ahidjo, who was then Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior under the Mbida’s administration. Later on, Xavier Torre would take over Ramadier as French High Commissioner on January 1958 (Takougang and Mbukum).
ONE PARTY RULE AND STATE - CONSTITUTION AND ITS DISCONTENT
As already stated, it is clear that the Constitution, being the primary source of domestic law, clearly established the hegemony of the state over political parties. As a result, the head of state was the sole organ responsible for determining, initiating and carrying out state policy (F. Sama Doh, “Civil Society and Governance in Africa and Beyond: Case Study on Assessing the Progress Made by Cameroon” (DPMF Workshop and Conference Proceedings, 1998).
Like in other third world and communist countries dominated by the one-party rule, neither in theory nor in practice was our political system favoring the supremacy of the presidency (executive) over the ruling party. In other words, there was a widespread trend in third word political sociology that the one-party system offered a medium of national unity and mass mobilization around evolving development goals beyond traditional, regional, or ethnic boundaries that divided nations; and that it was, as such, the proper channel through which the nation state could deliver social services and build strong support around the nationalistic core (Basil Davidson, Crossroads in Africa, Spokesman Books, 1980), 131.
In Cameroon, especially, the three branches of the state (legislative, executive, judicial) were not coordinate and equal branches of government, acting as checks and balances upon each other. Equally, the doctrine of judicial review of legislative and executive action did not have any counterpart in the Cameroonian political life. While the legislative body issues norms and the head of state promulgates them, political theory and practice emphasized the role of the party-state UNC as the fundamental source and ideological barometer of legislative and political decision making. In other words, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the UNC were as much more powerful body than appeared from the Constitution, and functioned as direct assistant or executive extension of the real seat of governmental power.
Christophe Dongmo
chrisdmo23@yahoo.com
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| [16.10.2009 | 14:55] BICNOIR |
*** Voici le jour où Biya ne sera plus Président de republique ***
>>>> Ce sera le .... du..... de l´an de grâce 20....à ....heures.
MR: BIYA sera immédiatement conduit à la maison d´arrête la plus proche de son arrêstation et mis sous mandat de dépôt.
Tous ses biens seront saissis et mis sous scéllé.....
Le commissaire ébéné organisera les enquêtes préliminaires et les auditions .
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| [14.10.2009 | 19:39] 1234abcd |
The party to which the president belongs should overide the opposing party in idealogy , policy and vote if you follow a democratic process. In a country where the President allows himself to extend his mandate via a constitutional amendment deemed illegal by the majority no longer governs legally and is in fact a de facto leader.
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Feymania : Donatien Koagne est mort
Mr DONGMO Christophe
Lokua Kanza ~ Meu Amor
